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MAQUILADORA OPERATIONS
A

COMMENT ON THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM IN
MEXICO
Zack V. Chayet*

The Maquiladora program was instituted in Mexico in the early
1960s. The purpose of this program was to create jobs for Mexicans, attract foreign investment, and bring needed technology to
Mexico. In the Maquiladora program components, equipment, and
machinery can enter Mexico duty free, where they are then assembled. The finished products are then exported to the United States.
Initially the process included only assembly operations. Today
the program, which is spread throughout the entire Mexican border
region, includes high-technology operations encompassing every aspect of the manufacturing process. The Maquiladora program is
now the second most important industry in Mexico, generating revenues surpassing even the tourism industry.
There are close to 740 Maquiladora plants operating in Mexico.
Participants include manufacturers of toys, furniture, clothing,
medical products, and other goods. Throughout Mexico, close to
200,000 individuals are employed in the Maquiladora program. In
the Ensenada, Tijuana, and Tecate areas there are more than 300
American and Japanese companies employing a total of 35,000
workers.
Labor costs as little as seventy-five cents per hour in Tijuana.
When one compares these wages with the average United States
hourly wage, the incentive to operate a plant is Mexico is obvious.
The Tijuana area is populated with over one million people. The
Department of Binational Affairs of the San Diego Council reports
that by the year 2000, the Tijuana and San Diego area will have
approximately four million people. Sixty percent of these people
will be between eighteen and twenty-three years of age. As long as
* Partner in Finley, Kumble, Wagner, Heine, Underberg, Manley, Myerson & Casey.
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U.S.' production costs remain high, cheap Mexican labor will be
attractive and conducive to the expansion of the Maquiladora
industry.
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAQUILADORA

INDUSTRY

Norris C. Clement*

Each day offshore export processing zones (EPZ's) become a
more integral part of the international economy, playing a larger
part in the manufacture and assembly of a growing array of goods
and services. Goods displaying labels with "Made in the U.S.A." or
"Made in Japan" are less common now than ten years ago. They
are being replaced with "Made in Taiwan" or "Assembled in Mexico." These labels indicate more than a geographical shift in the
production of some consumer goods. They represent a deliberate
thrust towards a new development strategy for a growing number
of large and small nations scattered throughout the world. This
strategy is more "outward looking" than previously.

I.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF MAQUILADORAS

For the United States, the use of "offshore sourcing" began as a
side effect of establishing manufacturing facilities in Europe, behind tariff walls, in order to increase sales to the giant European
Economic Community. For Japan, frequently called a nation of
maquiladoras because of its elaborate subcontracting system, the
decision to use offshore EPZ's apparently was a part of a deliberate
strategy to gain market shares in a world dominated by the United
States. Mexico created the maquiladora industry as an EPZ because of both the demonstrated success of other EPZ's in the Far
East, such as Taiwan and Singapore, and Mexico's need to solve
pressing social and economic problems.
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The Border Industrialization Program, which gave birth to the
industry in the mid-1960s, was designed to reduce unemployment
in Mexico's northern border region, generate foreign exchange, and
stimulate technology transfer to Mexico by attracting foreign manufacturing firms there to establish assembly operations. Since then,
and especially since the peso devaluations dating from 1982, the
industry has grown rapidly.
The term "maquiladora" comes from the Spanish word maquila,
which in colonial Mexico was the charge that millers collected for
processing grain. Today maquiladora stands as a generic term for
those firms which "process" (assemble and/or transform in some
way) components imported into Mexico which are then reexported.
Alternatively it can be said that maquiladora is an economic unit
for the production of goods or services based on the temporary importation of raw materials and equipment to be transformed in
Mexico and subsequently sold abroad.
The term "in-bond" industry comes from the fact that those
components which are imported into Mexico are imported under a
bonded status in order to insure that they are not sold in Mexico
markets, but are reexported for sales in foreign markets.
Another term frequently used is "twin plants," which refers to
the existence of two factories, one on either side of the border.
However, this does not accurately describe the arrangement for
most companies, since most of the foreign parent plants are not
located anywhere near the border. Originally, it was thought that
labor-intensive maquiladora operations in Mexico would assemble
components produced in capital intensive plants in the United
States, presumably in the border region, and then distribute the final products from the U.S. border plants. Generally, however, this
has not proved to be the case.'
At the end of 1986 there were, according to unofficial figures,
approximately 1,000 plants in the industry nationwide, employing
approximately 300,000 people and generating some 1.6 billion U.S.

I. Clement & Jenner, Location Decisions Regarding Maquiladora/ln-Bond Plants
Operating in Baja California, Mexico, San Diego, California, Institute for Regional Studies
of the Californias, San Diego State University, (1987).
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dollars in foreign exchange. 2 About 90% of these in-bond plants are
located in northern Mexico bordering the states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Most of these plants are owned by,
or have contracted relationships with, U.S. firms. Currently Mexico
produces approximately 40% of the goods imported into the United
States from developing countries under Tariff articles 806 and 8071
4
which allow duties to be paid on only the "value added" abroad.
Given its relative size and rate of growth, the maquiladora is the
newest "glamour industry" along the U.S.-Mexican border. It is
suggested that eventually the maquiladora industry will provide the
same economic stimulation to depressed U.S. border communities
that Mexican shoppers did during the oil boom period of 19771981. This "maquiladora boom" is attributed to several types of
potential advantages to U.S. or other foreign firms, which produce
relatively completed products having significant labor costs. These
advantages include:
1. Significantly reduced costs, especially labor;
2.
Table 1. The Maquiladora Industry in Mexico: Plants,
Employment, and Value Added*
Date
Year

Total No.
of Plants

Total Employment
(Yearly average)

Value Added
Dollars

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

57
72
79
108
120
209
339
357
455
454
448
443
547
540
620
605
585
600
672
789
858

3,000
4,257
17,936
17,000
15,858
20,327
20,000
48,060
64,330
75,974
67,214
74,496
78,433
90,704
111,365
119,546
130,973
127,048
150,867
199,684
217,544
246,617

81
102
165
278
444
454
536
525
714
638
773
976
851
829
1,200
1,300
1,600

* Through May 1986

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadigtica e lnformaci6n (INEGI); various publications.
3. See infra note I I and accompanying text.
4. See Table 2 on following page.
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2. One hundred percent foreign ownership, not usually possible in
Mexico; and
3. Proximity to the United States allowing:
a) lower transportation and communications costs,
b) the possibility of management and technical personnel living in the United States,
c) shorter down time for repairs and new product lines, and
d) greater control over day-to-day operations.

The available literature, although sparse, indicates there are significant benefits to the U.S. border cities in terms of increased incomes, jobs, and tax revenues associated with the growth of industry in Mexico.' Because of these advantages, both government
agencies and private firms located in the United States and Mexican border states implemented promotional campaigns designed to
attract U.S. and other foreign firms to establish in-bond plants in
Mexican locations adjacent to the United States.
The growth of the maquiladora/in-bond industry has been quite
extraordinary as can be seen from the data presented in Table 1.
Since 1965, the number of plants, total employment, and value
added have grown almost every year during the industry's twenty
Table 2. Dutiable Value of Imports Under 806/807 from Less
Developed Countries, 1985.
Country

U.S. $ (millions)

Percent

Mexico

$2,265

40

938
586
431
618
375
349
61

17
10
8
11
7
6
1

Singapore
Taiwan
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Philippines
Korea
Haiti
TOTALS

$5,642

100%

Source: Journal of the Flagstaff Institute 1986, as reported in The Industrial Development
Commission of Mexicali, MANUFACTURING IN MEXICALI: THE IN-BOND OR MAQUILADORA INDUSTRY HANDBOOK, 8th ed., Mexicali, 1986.

5. William L. Mitchell, Economic Impact of Maquila Industry in Juarez, Mexico in
El Paso, Texas and other sections of the United States for 1985, CIUDAD JUAREZ, GRUPO
BERMUDEZ INDUSTRIAL PARKS, 1986; and Clement & Jenner, supra note 3.
6. See supra note I.
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year lifespan. Table 37 illustrates the wide diversity of goods that

are processed in the industry. These tables demonstrate that various
types of electrical and electronic goods are clearly the most important group of products to pass through the maquiladora process,

with apparel being the next most important product group.
Table 48 shows that despite Baja California's dominance in terms
of number of plants (40%), the State of Chihuahua clearly generates the most jobs and the most value added. Larger "Fortune 500"
firms from the mid-west and eastern United States tend to fill Chihuahua's roster of U.S. firms, while Baja California seems to attract smaller, less well-known firms, mainly from Southern
California.
Nevertheless, Baja California may just now be coming into its
own in the sense that several large Japanese companies have lo-

cated "twin plants" in the Southern California-Baja California region in the belief that it will, in the medium and long term, provide
the best possible environment for capitalizing on some key develop-

ments including:
1. Increased sourcing from Far East EPZ's;
7.
Table 3. In-bond Manufacturing Plants in Mexico. Number of
Plants and Number of Employees According to Product
Categories (October 1985).
Plants
I. Electronic and electrical materials and
accessories
2. Electronic and electrical machinery and
appliances
3. Apparel
4. Transportation equipment and accessories
5. Services
6. Furniture
7. Toys and sporting goods
8. Shoes and leather
9. Food process
10. Tools
11. Chemical products
12. Other industries
TOTALS

Number of
Plants
198
86
110
69
44
72
24
36
12
21
3
111
786

(%)

(25)
(II)
(14)
(9)
(6)
(9)
(3)
(5)
(2)
(3)
(-)*
(14)
(101**)

Number of
Plants

(%)

56,907

(25)

45,816
32,149
44,441
14,075
7,168
7,418
4,896
2,149
2,516
99
14,889
232,523

(20)
(14)
(19)
(6)
(3)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(1)
*()
(100)

* Less than 1%.
** Adds up to 101 due to rounding.

Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportaci6n, Octubre 1985." INEGI,
Direcci6n General de lnform~tica, Mexico, D.F., 1985.
Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportacion, Octubre 1985." INEGI,
Direccion General de Informatica, Mexico, D.F., 1985.
8. See Table 4 on following page.
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2. The possibility of distributing to U.S. markets from west to

east;
3. Favorable wage and utility rates in Baja California;
4. A growing California market;9
5. A growing protectionist mood in the U.S. Congress; and
6. The tendency for the U.S. dollar to be devalued with respect
to the Japanese yen.
These and other factors are attracting other Asian countries to
opportunities that many industry observers believe are fantastic.
However, there are problems in the industry. High employee turnover rates, worker absenteeism, lack of physical infrastructure, and
Table 4. Maquiladora Plants by Principal Cities and States
January-August 1985
Plants
NATIONAL TOTAL

747

BAJA CALIFORNIA

301(40)
9
75
31
180

Ensenada
Mexicali
Tecate
Tijuana

Employment
207,817
38,691(19)
481
10,863
1,713
25,697

*Value Added
190,248
34,383(18)
478
10,572
1,148
22,185

BAJA CALIFORNIA SUR

La Paz
COAHUILA

Ciudad Acufia
Piedras Negras
Others
CHIHUAHUA

Ciudad Judrez
Ciudad Chihuahua
and Ojinaga

4

150

126

50
24
19
7

13,140
6,032
4,496
2,612

8,154
3,666
2,379
2,109

193(25)
167

87,951(42)
76,664

83,644
75,071

26

11,287

8,573

14

5,064

7,587

JALISCO

Guadalajara
ESTADO DE MEXICO
AND MEXICO, D.F.
SONORA

Agua Prieta
Nogales
Others
TAMAULIPAS

Matamoros
Nuevo Laredo
Ciudad Reynosa y
Rio Bravo
OTHER STATES

5

149

373

82
24
49
9

22,088
5,699
14,661
1,728

16,233
3,676
3,676
964

75(10)
35
14

36,167(17)
20,218
3,668

35,135(18)
22,744
3,514

26

12,281

8,877

23

4,417

4,609

* Value added in millions of pesos. Percentages in parentheses.
Source: "Estadistica de la industria maquiladora de exportaci6n, Enero, 1986" INEGI, 1986.
9. See supra note 1.
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shortages of trained technical and supervisory personnel are most
frequently mentioned as being potential bottlenecks over the next
three to five years. Yet most estimates see the industry expanding
at a 10% to 12% rate for some time.

II.

THE MAQUILADORA DEBATE IN CONGRESS

It seems appropriate to comment on the debate on the maquiladora in the U.S. Congress during the last year. While I have
presented my views on this debate in some detail elsewhere,1" a
short summary of the debate in view of the findings of our study
might prove useful.
The main issue must be seen in the larger context of U.S. "competitiveness." It focuses mainly on whether or not to retain articles
806/807 of the United States Tariff Schedule.' These articles permit the importation of products that have been assembled or somehow "processed" abroad while duties are levied only on the "value
added" to the (mainly) U.S.-manufactured components in the foreign country, as opposed to paying duties on the entire value of the
imported product.
This issue reemerged in October 1986 (it has already been debated extensively in the 1970s) when the Department of Commerce
used federal funds to promote the Mexican maquiladora program
among U.S. corporations at the "Expo Maquila" trade fair in
Acapulco, Mexico.
The congressional hearings, questioned both the propriety of using federal funds for such a purpose and the wisdom of preserving
articles 806/807. Representatives from mid-western and eastern
states are calling attention to the millions of U.S. jobs that have
been lost, and to the economic and social damage to affected communities in recent years as a consequence of all types of imports.
Their major point is that production sharing has not been employed
by U.S corporations as a defensive measure to maintain competitiveness, but as another way of increasing profits and exacting
"givebacks," at the expense of U.S labor and the health of the entire U.S. economy.
Nevertheless most corporations, with assembly plants in Mexico,
assert that they had to "go offshore" in order to maintain market
10. Clement & Jenner, Maquiladora: Do More Jobs for Mexico Benefit America as
Well?, San Diego Union, Feb. 22, 1987.
II. See U.S.T.S.A. (1987).
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share, and that production sharing actually saves the many higher
skilled manufacturing jobs in the U.S. which produce the components assembled abroad. They also claim that using plants in Mexico is much better for the U.S. economy than using similar facilities
in more remote areas such as Taiwan because many of the dollars
spent in Mexico and in support of Mexican facilities come right
back to the United States in the various forms noted above. Thus,
eliminating articles 806/807 would cause firms to either completely
relocate their production facilities off shore or to increase their
sourcing to EPZ's which are able to increase domestic value added
to the required 35% in order to minimize tariffs.
The findings of our study cannot be used to support conclusively
either of these two positions. The study was not designed to test
such propositions. Information gathered in the course of the study,
mainly in face-to-face interviews with maquiladora administrators
on both sides of the border, can, however, be helpful in understanding the dynamics of this industry and how those dynamics are likely
to affect U.S. and Mexican competitive standing and jobs in the
interim.
First, it should be noted that there is ample evidence to support
both sides of the debate. Clearly, the Mexican plants both maintain
and improve profitability and market share. However, sourcing in
Mexico has some negative effects on U.S. (especially California)
employment which may weaken unions or individual workers' bargaining positions. The major U.S. question concerning the Mexican
maquiladora industry is, whether the elimination of articles 806/
807 would save U.S. jobs and compel U.S. industry to act more
responsibly with respect to the overall health of the economy. Given
the fact that most U.S firms operating in Mexico use a high proportion of U.S. inputs, it would seem that eliminating 806/807
would not save jobs or benefit the U.S. economy.
Additionally, it must be acknowledged that any answer to this
question must be given within the context of the present complex
configuration of tariff laws. These laws include a General System of
Preferences (GSP) which allows certain developing nations to export limited quantities of goods (with at least 35% of the value
added in the developing country) duty free to developed countries
such as the United States. Thus U.S. companies, involved in off
shore sourcing, have two alternatives for minimizing costs related
to import duties, articles 806/807 of the U.S. Tariff Schedule and
the GSP. And, for such firms the GSP alternative is the more desir-

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol18/iss1/11

10

Chayet: Maquiladora Operations:
A Comment on the Maquiladora Program in M
19871
MAQUILADORA OPERATIONS

able of the two.
Moreover, U.S. firms involved in international production sharing
are more likely to be able to get GSP tariff breaks through Asian
EPZ's than Mexican. Interviews carried out in conjunction with
this study indicated that very few firms operating in Mexico are
able to increase the domestic (Mexican) content of their products
sufficiently to reach the required 35%. Thus, U.S. firms operating
Mexican maquilas are increasingly using Asian inputs in order to
lower overall costs. When asked if they would prefer to use Mexican inputs, virtually all responded that they would, but inferior
quality, high prices and unreliable delivery had kept them from doing so.
The Mexican government is very concerned about this situation
and has carried out a number of studies to determine both the potential demand for, and supply of, inputs into the maquiladora industry. One of the major objectives of the Mexican government
over the last decade or so has been to integrate border industry,
(and specifically the maquiladora industry) into the national economy which is mainly located in the interior of Mexico (i.e., in Mexico City, Monterrey and Guadalajara). Thus, the government is
now actively promoting Mexican manufacturing firms, which currently have a large excess capacity, to gear up to the requirements
of the maquiladora firms in order to respond to what appears to be
a golden opportunity. This seems to be the most important new development with respect to the Mexican maquiladora industry and
could have significant impacts on the 806/807 debate.
Currently U.S. proponents of the maquiladora industry lobbying
for the continued existence of articles 806/807, build their case
mainly on the claim that those provisions save U.S jobs which produce U.S. components utilized in EPZ's throughout the world, but
mainly in Mexico. In other words, articles 806/807 save U.S. jobs
by utilizing U.S. components in Mexico that otherwise would be
lost to Asian suppliers that tend to utilize the provisions of GSP.
However, the current situation is changing rapidly. Not only are
U.S. firms increasing their use of Asian inputs in their Mexican
plants, but pressure is building for Mexican manufacturing firms to
increase their sales to maquiladora firms. Thus, it is possible that
within a few years, articles 806/807 will be less significant than
they are today, despite the rapid growth of the maquiladora industry. This could make claims that articles 806/807 save U.S. jobs,
less valid and less applicable than they are today.
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A dramatic increase in the use of Mexican inputs in U.S.-based
maquiladoras would significantly advance the Mexican economy
and would satisfy U.S. policy-makers who fear that Mexico's current economic crisis could be a source of future political instability.
But, Mexico's gain, resulting in the increased export of U.S. jobs,
will imply our loss. Thus, the maquiladora debate could reemerge.
The debate will probably disappear permanently only when the
U.S. economy has moved closer to full employment.
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